








In May 1993, a month before a national referendum was held in
Malawi, when the population was asked whether the country should
change its political system from a single-party state to a multi-party
democracy, a small incident took place in Chiradzulu district, just
north of the country's main city of Blantyre. As was the case else-
where in the country's Southern région, the campaigns of single-party
advocates versus those of the multi-party option were intense.
Throughout the Chiradzulu district those marching with the symbol
(the black cock) of the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP) were
confronted with those marching with the 'lamp', the icon of the multi-
party opposition. That particular day a car showing the MCP's
insignia forced a car belonging to the United Nations international
observers' team - including the current author - to stop at the side of
the road and a neatly dressed elderly gentleman jumped out.
Trembling with anger hè screamed at the observers: 'In this country
we teach respect for old âge! What have you been telling those boys
at the registration-office down there? That they should act disre-
spectfully? This is how we dress in this country! Those boys cannot
teil a "father" how to behave!'
Though the observers were stunned by the anger of the old man, a
little later a more coherent story was revealed to them. The man was
the local MCP party chairman who by profession was accustomed to
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wear a party tie. On entering the nearby registration office, however,
a number of young men in their twenties, belonging to the local oppo-
sition monitor group had bluntly refused him access to the office,
justifying their décision by pointing to his tie. 'No propaganda-mate-
rial is allowed within a füll circle of 100 mètres around the office',
they explained, 'these instructions have reached us through the inter-
national observers who visited this office ten minutes ago'. Thus the
elderly gentleman had set off to chase the observers, blaming them
for the young men's 'irresponsible' behaviour.
In a recent article, Schatzberg (1993), draws attention to the
metaphor of the 'father' in African political culture. In this metaphor
a model of political leadership is conceived in which notions of geron-
tocratie rule, respect for old âge and a promise of nurture and
parental care are brought together. The notion of leadership is placed
in discourses of relational ties which at the same time indicate limits
on the exécution of power. The discourse of the 'father' formulâtes
these limits in terms of what care is expected, to what extent the father
'feeds' and is allowed to 'eat', how long his reign should last and how
hè should treat dépendants, particularly women and the young
(Schatzberg, 1993:451-3). In short, for Schatzberg, gerontocratie rule
is commonly perceived in many African societies in the context of its
procreative functions.
However, Schatzberg does not explain how processes of democra-
tization might influence the meaning and représentations of the
father-metaphor in political leadership in Africa. In this chapter I
want to explore the relationship between the father-metaphor, geron-
tocratie power, democratization and religion in the context of a
changing Malawian political culture. Insignificant as the incident
described above may seem to be, it is in fact extremely indicative of
the dramatic transition in generational power relations that occurred
in part as a conséquence of the democratization process in Malawi.
The two-stage process of democratie change in the country (in June
1993 a national referendum, in May 1994 multi-party genera! and
presidential élections) bas so far mainly been studied from the point
of view of national politics and the different elites - political, religious
and ethnie - who became important players (see Venter, 1992;
Gullen, 1994; Chirwa, 1994; Newell, 1995; Van Donge, 1995; Kaunda,
1995; Kaspm, 1995) Few authors have taken a different approach to
the study of the democratization process, either by looking at local
understandings and perceptions of what the political changes really
meant to the populace (see for instance Englund, 1996, for a welcome
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exception) or by looking at the rôle of non-elite religieus groups in
the process (see for instance Fiedler, 1995, and Van Dijk, 1998a).
What has been striking in the scholarly debate about the democra-
tization process in Malawi is the marked absence of attention to the
rôle and position of the yoanger génération. To this writer, democra-
jtization appeared to signal a change in the nature of the dominant
'gerontocratie power relations and to give the young an opportunity to
escape from their tightly circumscribed socio-politieal space in what
for 30 years had been a highly supervised society. For three decades
the 'father and founder' of independent Malawi, Dr H. Kamuzu
Banda, had developed a type of leadership structure that skilfully
combined the socio-cultural values of a) respect for old âge; b) geron-
tocratie rule; and c) the basic tenets of what hè considered
'Chewa-cultural traditions'. The Chewa is the country's largest ethnie
group, to whieh Banda claimed affilitation. The point is that the polit-
ical-Ieadership model, from independenee in 1964 onwards, held the
youth captive, in terms of both discourse and practice.
This peculiar leadership model was not so much that of a 'father' in
the sense described by Schatzberg, but rather that of the nkhoswe, the
mother's brother in Chewa culture. Former president Banda was
referred to in Chichewa (the language of the Chewa) as Nkhoswe
Number One, while, strikingly, in this context the name of father in
the vernacular ('Bambo' or 'Atate') would certainly not apply. The
référence to nkhoswe for the state leadership made clear the implica-
tions this model held for the structurally subservient position of the
younger génération in society. On the level of national political
culture the young was forced into a highly subservient rôle vis-à-vis
local party structures dominated by elderly people. MCP rule effec-
tively replaced traditional authority on a supra-local level and
designated the young to act as a coercive force in state formation and
as an implementing agency of the party's power in every corner of
social life.
With the advent of dêmocrftic changes, for considérable numbers
of the younger génération this rôle of subservience was no longer
acceptable. They hot ohly rallied en masse to the new opposition
groups that emerged after ihje Catholic bishops published their first-
ever dissenting Lénten Letter in March 1992. They also became, as I
witnessed many times, the de facto Organizers of local support groups
and monitor groups (also within the MCP !) which eventually evolved
into an intricate network covering over 2000 voting centres. Writing
from his expériences in Dedza-district in Malawi, Englund states:
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As was the case apparently in many other areas of Malawi, it was the
youth, particularly young men, who were the first to adopt the multi-
party cause... as the most vocal and visible supporters, "youngsters'
(anyamatd) were perceived by many villagers as epitomes of mati-
pati' [multiparty in the vernacular] (Englund, 1996:120).
When the government started to react harshly and violently to the
demands for democracy and to the writers and bearers of the Lénten
Letter, it sparked off unprecedented démonstrations by secondary
school and university students in Malawi's main cities, in defence of
the newly won freedoms (Newell, 1995:253). As was demonstrated by
the fierce reaction of the political leadership to these protests, the
young appeared to be able to contest the grounds of légitimation for
the exécution of power by those who belonged to the circles of the
ruling party's hegemony.
Since the opposition came to power (the newly formed United
Democratie Front or UDF led by the present president Bakili Muluzi
gained victory in the May 1994 élections) the question remains to .
what extent gerontocratie rule and légitimation of power, as they were j
perceived to be linked with Chewa political traditions, have changed *
as well. In other words, did the position the younger génération took
during the process of democratie transition represent a change on a
much more profound level: that of gerontocratie power structures, in
place since pre-colonial times?
Bayart has noted the coïncidence of generational politics and demo-
cratie structural changes in Africa. He writes that youth is the one
social category to resist as they have nothing to lose in their struggle to
survive under the heavy-handed authority of their elders (Bayart,
1986:119). The question is whether in the Malawian context democra-
tization has been able to penetrate into and subsequently change the
structures and root paradigms of hegemonie authority and power,
This contribution intends to address the question whether, as has been
the case for the anthropological study of symbolism, ritualism and
power (see Arens and Karp, 1989), a shift within democratization
studies from 'structure' to 'meaning' should be employed in order to
interpret the changes at a deeper level of political culture.
This chapter propounds the view that in political culture a change
in the meaning of root paradigms précèdes and prépares changes in
the structure of political Systems. Although the structure may rernain
the same, the nature, quality and meaning of social-cultural values
such as respect for old age and gerontocratie rule might change. The
ta
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socio-political meaning of gerontocracy and the subséquent position
of the young has gone through a number of changes in Malawi of
which democratization forms the latest stage. Religion in général, and
'born-again' Christianity in particular, played a significant rôle in
changing the meaning of the crucial root paradigm of gerontocracy in
Malawian political culture. In examining the changes in the deeper
layers of Malawian culture this contribution shows that, contrary to
what is usually stated, Christian fundamentalism-cum-pentecostalism
and its apparently conservative ideology can in fact be interpreted as
a significant socio-political factor in the process of democratie transi-
tion in Malawi.
By the late 1970s 'born-again' (often pentecostal) groups appealed
to many in the younger génération because of their attacks on the
gerontocratie principles of both religious and political models of lead-
ership. Pentecostal youth groups, originating in Malawi's main urban
areas in the 1970s and 1980s, created a discourse in which the powers
of the elderly were seen in moral terms and denounced as evil. These
groups up to the early 1990s did not reshape the manifest geronto-
cratie structures of society, which had become interwoven with the
fabric of social life, but they daringly reformulated the meaning that
on a deeper level was attached to these forms of power. Basically what
they attacked were the mystical connotations of gerontocratie power,
the 'religious terror', as described by Meillasoux (1981:12,45,82,87),
that belonged to the realm of authority of the elderly. The pente-
costalism propagated by the young was a force that slowly began to
demystify and desacralize these ground-layers of gerontocratie rule.
This process became manifestly political by 1992 when the young
started to support massively, by 'leg-work' at the grass roots, the
process of democratie transition.
This chapter also intends to show that the position adopted by such
religious youth groups was the outcome of a 'struggle for youth' that
Malawian society had faced by rival, competing power domains since
colonial times, in which religion played a highly significant part. In so
doing it proposes to deconstruct and redefine the so-called 'conserv-
ative nature' of Christian fundamentalism-cum-pentecostalism, and
calls for an in-depth study of its significance for the change of
meaning of political root paradigms.
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COOPTATION OF THE YOUNG IN A POLITICAL
TRADITION: THE NKHOSWE MODEL AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR YOUTH
At the end of the nineteenth Century the Presbyterian, Roman
Catholic and Anglican churches began to engage in what can be
called a struggle for the control over the younger génération in what
would become known as the Nyasaland Protectorate, later indepen-
dent Malawi. As Carmody showed for the East-Zambia border area
in great detail, the establishment of schools was used as a strategy to
mark off areas over which a particular dénomination had gained
influence not only vis-à-vis other dénominations, but also in relation
to particular traditional authorities (Carmody, 1988: 204). Schools
became a device in the hands of the missionaries to limit the control
of traditional authorities and the elderly over the young. They were
also useful in creating a youthful, able local work force for training in
- bureaucratie, trade and commercial -jobs required in the formation
and development of the colony.
During the early decades of the twentieth Century the older section
of the Protectorate's population became increasingly worried by the
social changes set in train by the coming of the missions. Being sent
to boarding school not only meant absence from the village - in the
sense of not being able to offer one's labour force for agricultural
produce - but also experiencing a cultural conversion in which thé
backwardness of village life, particularly in its moral and ideological
aspects, was underscored (McCracken, 1977: 118-21; Fields, 1985:
40-3). From thé mission schools came the 'new men', those who
would no longer be submissive to gérontocratie, village-based author-
ity, who would have independent means of livelihood and who would
acquire a différent ideological apparatus. Some would even start
independent churches, stressing further their autonomy. Contesting
the schooling programmes of thé churches and further claims on thé
youth by thé formative colony, thé elderly in many parts of the
Protectorate tried to strengthen their claims on youthful labour
power. Although thé précise practice varied throughout thé
Protectorate, it is clear that thé young - especially young men - held
subservient social positions, a situation which the mission churches
sought to explot in order to gain converts.
On a political level thé search for autonomy by thé young via thé
mission educational System led in thé 1950s to thé formation of the
nationalist movement which later evolved into thé Nyasaland African
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Congress (NAC). The young leaders of the movement, some of them
in their early twenties, searched for a prominent Malawian who would
be able to head the struggle for independence. In Ghana they found
a médical practitioner, Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, persuading him
to come to Nyasaland to fight the inclusion of the Protectorate in a
Fédération with North and Southern Rhodesia (see, for a detailed
account, Lwanda, 1993). Banda succeeded in fighting the 'stupid
fédération' and led the NAC to independence in 1964. By then,
however, it had become painfully clear to the young leadership of the
independence movement that they had helped a new gerontocratie
ruler to power. In the so-called Cabinet Crisis of 1964 the résistance
the young party-leaders and'ministers were mounting against Banda's
rule was violently crushed (see fof a review of this period Williams,
1978; Lwanda, 1993: 69).
From the inception of his rule Banda referred to himself as the
'Nkhoswe Number One', that is to say the symbol of the whole of the
Malawi nation, thus allowing him to call his new Cabinet ministers
anyamata anga: 'my boys'. From this time, Banda continuously
referred to Chewa cultural values and traditions and took the Chewa
models of authority as the idéal for the new political culture of inde-
pendent Malawi, 'As a cultural broker for the Chewa, Banda had a
broader vision, however, than merely formulating an ideological
statement for hts ethnie group alone. He instead equated 'Malawian-
ness' with 'Chewa-ness', depicting the Chewa as the very soul of the
country (Vail and White, 1989; 182). Chichewa, the language of the
Chewa, became in addition to English the national tongue.
; ;? Chewa rituals, such as those belonging to the Nyau secret society,
included dances elevated to the status of national festivities (see
Kaspin 1993), and the young, it was feit, had once again to be brought
back under proper gerontocratie control. The younger génération in
Banda's view had to be turned into the nation's 'workhorse', the
'spearhead of progress' in a position structurally similar to what it had
been in the Chewa Chikamwini model. Consequently, two national
youth organizations were formed: the paramilitary Malawi Young
Pioneers (MYP) and the political wing of the sole governing party,
the League of Malawi Youth (Ayufl in the vernacular). The MYP,
clothed in khaki uniforms, was explicitly given the task of introducing
agricultural innovations from their training bases. TheAyufi, clothed
in red shirts and green trousers or skirts, were given the job of assist-
ing the organization of the public functions of the party and ils local
party chairmen.
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Within a short span of time Banda developed an extremely tough,
hardened and above all loyal youth body that pledged an oath of alle-
giance to the 'father and founder' of the Malawi nation, the Nkhoswe
Number One. As Banda placed himself on top of the traditional
authority hierarchy, likewise local party leaders placed themselves
above local village headmen and group village headmen. These local
party chairmen had an instrument at their disposai which the local
traditional authorities simply lacked: the local branches of the MYP
and the League of Malawi Youth. At the local level both youth bodies
developed into the most deeply feared instruments of control and
coercion (Van Dijk, 1992a: 134-55, see also Englund, 1996: 118).
Party membership was compulsory for all adult Malawians and the
Youth Leaguers (especially Üie Ayufl) were frequently used to check
the possession of party cards and compulsory attendance at party
meetings. Entering a market, hospital or bus-station was only allowed
after showing a party card to the member of the Ayufl blocking the
entrance. Members of the youth organizations would mingle with
local sports groups, visitors to bars and restaurants, gatherings at
funerals, and the like to record any form of dissent and protest against
the regime's increasingly tight supervision and intolérance. The youth
groups and their related secret bodies had become so effective that by
the end of 1980s Malawi had turned into one of the most supervisée!
countries in Africa. State power was represented in almost every
corner of society through an intricate network of informants, training
camps, teachers, roadblocks and Checkpoints which was almost
beyond imagination in its effectiveness for such a country, one of the
ten poorest in the world.2
The means and opportunities for the mission churches to gain
direct access to the younger génération in Malawi steadily diminished
after independence in 1964 and the Amendment Act the following
year. The mission youth organizations, such as the Scouts and the
Brigades, were forbidden (Lamba, 1985). The mission schools were
placed under the direct control of the government which decided on
the intake of pupils and the appointment of teachers. All other
matters concerning youth and youth organizations were referred to
the Ministry of Youth and to the commanders in charge of the two
formal youth bodies, the MYP and the Youth League. Christian
student and Christian workers organizations were heavily controlled
regarding the political content of their activities. The mission
churches were explicitly forbidden to intervene in important Chewa
rituals such as the Gule Wamkulu, the 'big dance' of the Chewa Nyau
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secret sociejiesfïieithêrwere Jhèy allowed to desacralize the impor-
tant Chewa jfitiati^n rites. Consequently, such churches rapidly lost
ground in thëir Jfitempts to win the 'hearts and minds' of the
Malawian younger'génération. The outcome was that, compared to
their pre-independence position, they were losing the struggle for
youth.
RELIGIOUS INTERVENTION AND MOBILIZATION
In March 1992 the Roman Catholic bishops published a Lenten
Letter in which they, for the first time in post-independence history,
protested against the répression* poverty and harassment of political
opponents that had become the trademark of 30 years of Banda's
dictatorship (Callen, 1994f Newell, 1995; Nzunda and Ross, 1995). As
elesewhere in Africa at this time, church leaders were calling for a
democratization of the political system (Diamond, 1993; Witte, 1993;
Joseph, 1993). The political elite reacted violently and, as they did at
all other instances when jlissenting voices could be heard, deployed
the MYP to intiraidate Catholie clergy and church members and to
install a genera! reign of terror against all who wanted to take protests
further. Locally the Nyau society, sometimes in collaboration with the
MYP (Englund, 1996:117), established a reign of terror in an attempt
to influence and curb the growing popularity of religious and later
secular opposition groups (Kaspin, 1995: 617).
f- Through the intervention of the Vatican, after some months of
confusion, talks were opened between the bishops and the MCP
government in which the Presbyterian churches joined (with the
exception of that group of churches, the so-called Nkoma-Synod,
belonging to the heartland of the Chewa-speaking région from where
Banda originated and where he still held a position as church elder.)
The churches established the Public Affairs Committee (PAC),
providing an umbrella to the opposition groups slowly emerging in
various parts of the country at this time. The PAC began to negotiate
the terms for an eventual democratie transition with the Presidential
Committee on Dialogue (PCD) and by November 1992, at the so-
called 'Kwacha-Conference', an understanding was reached. A
national referendum was to be held on the issue of changing from a
single to a multi-party system. The country's opposition was allowed
to form itself into pressure groups, given liberty to present its views in
public and to run campaigns. In reality, however, intimidation by the
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two political youth bodies was rife. It proved to be extremely effective
in closing off entire districts from the activities of the opposition
(Englund, 1996:116-19; Kaspin, 1995: 617). Two opposition groups,
the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) with a stronghold in the
Northern Region and the United Democratie Front (UDF) with a
power base in the South, eventually gained victory in the général élec-
tions.
As the pressure groups were rather weak in both structural and
financial terms, the Roman Catholic and Presbyterian churches effec-
tively ran aspects of the multi-party campaign. They were active in
negotiating a free and fair process, in mobilizing massive support
from the youth, in distributing civic éducation material, in monitoring
the registration and voting centres, and in reporting cases of intimi-
dation and harassment (see for various aspects of the churches'
involvement on various levels Gullen, 1994; Newell, 1995; Nzunda
and Ross, 1995). Suddenly the churches were able to move back again
into a central position where youth was concerned; even in the most
remote places youth were included in the PAC programmes. It
became extremely fashionable to wear and show the insignia of PAC,
a mixture of Christian symbolism of the cross, the rosary, and the nyali
- the lamp as the sign of the light that multi-partyism would bring. As
I witnessed many times, PAC youth spent many hours on civic éduca-
tion, explaining to the elderly people in the villages that 'matepatty'
was not just another party but an entirely different system that would
allow greater participation in the political running of the country.
AFORD and UDF rallies were usually opened by young PAC repré-
sentatives who in prayers and songs would request the benevolent
heavenly powers to lend support to their just cause. A number of
younger Presbyterian and Catholic priests joined the ranks of the
opposition groups, one of them being the well-known Reverend Peter
Kaleso who in the mid-1980s had been a supporter of the Born-Again
movement in Blantyre (Van Dijk, 1992a: 140).
The churches' success in mobilizing the young on such a large scale
for the 'leg-work' of the national referendum can certainly in part be
attributed to the fact that up to a week or so prior to voting day, rally-
ing publicly behind the pressure groups was in many parts still a
dangerous thing to do.3 It was safer to support PAC as a représenta-
tive of the churches as they enjoyed considérable room for manoeuvre
in Malawian society.
While the National Referendum of June 1993 gave a victory to
PAC and the united opposition groups, it did signal the importance of
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regionalism with the political marginalization of some ethnie groups
in the country4. In sum, however, the Northern and Southern régions
of the country voted massively in favour of a change to multi-party-
ism, while the Centre, heartland of Chewa culture and the home area
of Banda, still clung to single-party MCP rule.
During the following months, negotiations between the opposition
and the governraent took place, concerned with the organization of
the général élection. The opposition groups attempted to broaden
their support base into the Central région, while the MCP tried to do
the same for the other régions. During the second half of 1993
however it became increasingly clear that the MCP youth organiza-
tions were a stumbling block to any real change in political power
relations. In particular, the heavily armed elite sections of the MYP
were viewed as real threats to the opposition groups in their attempts
to reach the public through campaigning. However, in December
1993, the power of the MYP was finally crushed in an unprecedented
- and violent - action by the army against MYP camps located near
the cities of Lilongwe in the Centre and Mzuzu in the North. The
camps were demolished after three soldiers were killed in a fight
between soldiers and MYP members of the Mzuzu base. In the opér-
ation - known as Bwezani - thousands of MYP cadres were chased,
disarmed and sent home. Their barracks, headquarters, cars and
trucks were set ablaze (Van Donge, 1995: 9).
The formerly important rôle of political youth in the supervision of
Malawian society ended here. All sorts of Victorian and puritan laws
and régulations concerning dress and behaviour in public were soon
abolished and the MCP's capacity to supervise the everyday life of
Malawian citizens was significantly reduced. The MCP engaged itself
in a process of internai reorganization, without however changing the
gerontocratie significance of power in its circles. The 94-year-old
Banda remained in power. In the run up to the général élections of
May 1994, the intricate relationship between local party leaders and
local traditional leaders remained intact, manifestly within the Chewa
Central région, and in a more covert way in the Northern and
Southern régions.
However, the 'purification' from youth supervision in the course of
the général élection campaign also led to damage to the status of
several of the opposition's leading figures. The two most important
leaders of UDF, the prospective president Bakili Muluzi and his most
effective campaign leader Aleke Banda, had been prominent leaders
within the MCP party structure in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Van
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Donge, 1995: 258). The same was true of some prominent members
of AFORD. But in the media the rôle the top UDF men had played
in earlier years was in particular critically and extensively discussed,
the fear being that soon after the expected victory by UDF in the
général élections new coercive, state-sponsored youth bodies would
be formed.
The May 1994 genera! élections saw a diminished rôle for youth,
organized on a religieus basis, in the monitoring and logistics of the
registering and élection process. The rôle of PAC was greatly reduced
as the opposition groups were not only able to move independently
but also able to organize the masses of young supporters under their
own jurisdiction. Moving their attention away from the political field,
the churches were redefining their rôle in society: now it was in terms
of a kind of national 'watch dog', keen to ensure the durability of the
newly acquired democratie rights. Support was given in particular to
a number of the new human rights organizations, to the process of
constitutional reform and to the activities of a Commission of Inquiry,
established to deal with the most serious incidents of MCP-inspired
political violence.
Concern with the human rights record in Malawi led in early 1995
to a number of arrests of prominent persons, including, amazingly,
that of the former life-president Dr Banda, on a charge of being
involved in the assassination of political opponents in 1983. A more
profound démystification and desacralization of power could not
have taken place. Just a month earlier, Banda had been proclaimed
for his 'exceptional rain-making powers' in the press still favouring
the MCP. A report in a Malawian newspaper of 29 November 1994
proclaimed: 'Kamuzu Excels as Rains Finally Come'.5 Now, however,
the denigration of the form of authority hè stood for was clear. To
understand this we need to take a closer look at some of the changes
- including the important rôle of Christian fundamentalism - in the
ritual significance and connotations of gerontocratie power in Malawi
society.
PENTECOSTALISM AND POWER
Since the early 1970s Malawi's urban centres have seen the rise of a
number of Christian fundamentalist groups led by young itinérant
preachers, varying in age between nine and 30 years (see also Van
Dijk, 1992a, 1992b, 1993,1995,1998a).6 These young people attracted
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crowds by conducting large revival meetings at which they, in fire and
brimstone sermons, strongly denounced the sinfulness and evils of
everyday urban life. The activities of this movement of born-again
pentecostals (theAbadwa Mwatsopano as they were and are called in
the local language) soon caught the attention of the authorities, but
the local party leaders did not seem eager to curb it. This may have
been because the born-again preachers did not attack the genera!
supervisory model of Malawian society, nor did they openly criticize
the subservient position of the younger génération in society, watched
over by the cadres of the MYP and Youth League organizations.
Rather, their activities dealt with attaching new meanings to power
and authority as a social commentary on what gerontocratie power in
society stood for. This they attained by providing alternative
trajectories for gaining power, trajectories that were (and still are)
phrased in religious terms and thereby were able to escape from the
political gaze of the authorities in the 1970s and 1980s.
The allegedly conservative political nature of fundamentalist-cum-
pentecostal movements in Africa and elsewhere has reached the level
of an almost undisputed fact, a taken for granted reality in the social
science studies of religion (Gifford, 1991; Marshall, 1993). The
quietist attitude of these movements is either attributed to the impor-
tance of personal healing in their religious discourse (Schoffeleers,
1985) or to a conservative religious imperialism for which North
American evangelical churches are held responsible (Caplan, 1987;
Gifford, 1991; Marty & Scott Appleby, 1991; Deiros, 1991). Those
studies that underscore the manifestly acquiescent nature of the
movements fail to acknowledge the latent éléments of résistance that
can also be found if a method of obtaining data is followed that allows
for the incorporation of meanings attached to signs and practices,
muted discourses, dress and style. Those who (limiting myself to the
African context) adopted such an approach to fundamentalist move-
ments clearly came up with a rather different view of the socio-cultural
significance of these movements in terms of covert protest and bidden
transcripts (Comaroff, 1985; Ojo, 1988; Marshall, 1993; Van Dijk,
1993,1995,1998a)
In this paragraph I will argue that the born-again movement in
Malawi was not acquiescent in a cultural sensé, but attacked thé
single most important root paradigm of political culture and thereby
acted as a precursor of démocratie changes. The first born-again
preacher-leaders (alaliki, literally 'announcers', as they called them-
selves) to take up thé 'call' to preach belonged to an urban class of
/'•l
rather well-educated college and university students. Later, in the
early and mid-1980s, a second group of younger preachers emerged
who, in contrast, had generally been able only to receive a few years
of primary schooling. Such people certainly did not belong to a young
urban elite. Many of these second-génération preachers conducted
their religious activities on a full-time basis, contrary to the earlier
ones. The aim of the former was that, via their preaching activities,
they would aim to provide themselves with a livelihood. More gener-
ally, their born-again movement very much belonged to what is
known as the 'second pentecostal wave' which swept through Sub-
Saharan Africa from the early 1980s (Schoffeleers, 1985). This
movement transcended the earlier missionary-based pentecostalism,
already established in Africa from the first decades of the twentieth
Century.
In the late 1990s these itinérant young preachers could still be
found promulgating a doctrine characterized by strict morality. In
strong terms, the use of alcoholic beverages, cigarettes and drugs was
' denounced. They also fulminated against adultery, promiscuity,
violence and theft. Furthermore, the 'satanic' habit of frequenting
bars, hotels and discos was condemned: all were understood to be
places of utmost moral depravity. Demands were also expressed for a
rejuvenated morality, put forward in an atmosphère of religious
excitement and émotion. While the audience was urged to sing and
dance, sinners were commanded to kneel in front of the young
preachers, who insisted that evil objects - such as knives, tobacco,
stolen goods and above all, magical esoteric objects - be handed in.
Those present were urged to receive the 'infilling' of the Holy Spirit,
stressed as the single most important way to become cleansed of
worldly, defiling forces. Only after living through a mystical rebirth by
experiencing this 'infilling' was a person considered to be born again
(kubadwa mwatsopano).
Speaking in tongues (malilime) was a central element of worship,
ritual and symbolic practice within the born-again movement. No
meeting could be held without a session of religious ecstasy: people
grovelled on the ground, sweating profusely, while shouting all kinds
of incompréhensible sounds. Going through such an expérience was
compulsory before one could be considered born again. The général
view was that by becoming born again a line was established with
benevolent, heavenly powers. In this process malilime became the
absolute assurance that one had succeeded in tapping into a purifying
superior power, protecting one's day-to-day existence and healing
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various 'mystical' afflictions, even including witchcraft. In sum, malil-
ime offered the true believer the possibility and power to withstand
evil forces. Born-again preachers feit empowered to detect witchcraft
and related harmful objects, convinced that they could not härm
them when they came into contact with devilish objects and related
practices.
One of the best-known preachers of the group of 30 that I studied
in the city of Blantyre was a young woman of 24 years of age, named
Linley Mbeta, who claimed that she could see a hand coming down
from heaven to indicate to her the sinners among her audience. She
became a national figure, known for her effective anti-witchcraft
campaigns, after an allegedly literal rebirth she experienced in April
1985. Because of her cleansing powers and her strong calls for confes-
sion and conversion her preaching sessions nationwide were and are
much in demand. Often, however, her conduct caused resentment
among thé elderly, because she openly, as is common in the entire
movement, held this génération responsible for thé existence and
power of witchcraft in society. At one of her sessions she stated:
Where do you think you shall go with those charms (zitumwa)
which were left to you by your grandparents, you fools? You, you
are learners today. It takes hours for you to bewitch a person, but
you still cling to your witchcraft (ufitï), just because your forefa-
thers handed over the charms to you. Fools, if thèse charms were
thé things which could lead somebody into thé Heavenly Kingdom
I doubt if your grandparents could hâve handed thé charms to you,
but because they are thé things which lead somebody to hell, this is
why they handed them over to you before they died. Only to
increase thé number of people to accompany them on their way to
hell!
An important aspect of malilime is that thé rigid puritan order advo-
cated by thé preachers entails a rejection of the way the elderly are
generally believed to become 'ripened' or 'empowered' (kukhwimà).
A person is considered to be kukhwimà if hè has been able to build up
a position of considérable, wide ranging influence in society. Such an
individual will very often be wealthy thanks to successful business
schemes. He is not only expected to hâve an influential position in
one of thé bigger mission churches, as well as in his home village in
kinship affairs, but also to hâve secured a powerful political position.
But in being kukhwimà every such person is also likely to incur some
people's suspicion, not least from born-again preachers, that he has
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sought thé support of malicieus forces. Kukhwimà has thé primary
connotation of having been able to master thé forces that lie in witch-
craft and its related objects, applied, strategically, to one's own ends.
In fact kukhwimà is thé single most important element of the powers
and authority of thé elderly, thé chiefs and anybody else who acts as a
surety to the well-being of the kin-group. Without being 'ripened'
through dealings with thé powers of day and night no surety (thé
nkhoswe) is able to exert his influence and protection over the kin-
group.
The born-again preachers, however, stress thé expérience and
empowerment of malilime rather than that of kukhwimà. Success in
thé mundane world, as well as freedom and protection from any kind
of affliction and misfortune, can only be acquired through malilime,
which in its turn requires individuals to maintain a purified and unsul-
lied status. On the other hand, being kukhwimà almost by définition
entails impurity and involvement in practices not nieant for public
scrutiny. Malilime thereby opposes thé authority of the elderly as no
allowance is made for the generally respected source of their powers.
The ideological programme proclaimed by thèse preachers, focus-
ing on a purification of an ever-widening circle in social life, in this
sensé can be interpreted as a modern transformation of the earlier
puritan movements in Malawi. Puritanism, présent in Malawi since
thé early 1930s in thé form of various anti-witchcraft movements, thus
provided thé means and the basis for thé younger génération to
confront thé gérontocratie authority of the elderly both in political
and religieus terras (thé so-called Mchape-movements, see Richards,
1935; Ranger, 1972; Fields, 1985).
In modem urban conditions some young people also presented
forms of puritan ideology, assertively seeking to contest the trad-
itional gerontocratie mode of political and religieus control in society,
still paramount, as discussed above, in thé 1970s, 1980s and into thé
1990s. By presenting a Christian fundamentalist ideology filled with
notions of morality, sin and rédemption, obédience to leadership, and
so on, thé preachers were able to outflank thé Banda régime in its
désire to portray them as subversive, a threat to thé nation's 'peace,
calm, law and order'. Instead, thé young preachers managed to ob tain
a niche in thé social fabric of thé heavily supervised life in Malawian
society. Consequently they set up organizations, large revival meet-
ings, 'crusades' and even meetings of a more secretive nature that
were and still are held at night in thé townships or on top of certain
hüls.
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Within the circle of young preachers malïlime is a clear identity
marker. But a serious breach of the circle occurs when the channel of
inspirational power from the heavenly forces is either not maintained,
or denied or exchanged for a different and/or contesting line of
power. In this sense the elderly are excluded as they represent the
involvement in other - undesirable to the born-agains - lines of power
such as witchcraft and politics. The exclusion of the elderly, however,
extends in a cultural sense beyond the boundary of age itself, also
referring to a range of symbolical repertoires, styles, rituals, and so
on, that in addition fall within a perception of a moral environment,
a moral geography. The born-again ideology includes the perception
that those symbolical repertoires in which the elderly still play a dom-
inant part in fact belong to a moral milieu that has to be both
repudiated and forgotten.
This 'crusade' became the focal point of the young preachers'
attempts to establish their own moral geography. It is worth noting
that one of the f irst - and certainly one of the most important - young
preachers' organizations was tellingly called 'The Pentecostal Revival
Crusade Ministry', led by the famous Madalitso Mbewe (Van Dijk,
1995; see also Oifford, 1987, 1991, 1993 on the significance of
crusades in other fundamentalist groups in Africa). The elderly are
the prime targets in the crusades and are excluded from its organiza-
tion (Van Dijk, 1995: 186). The young preachers' crusade flouts the
power that ankhoswe, malume and mother-in-laws wield over them
when it cornes, for example, to marriage. Some of the older 'young'
preachers sometimes even take over the cérémonial functions of the
nkhoswe as a marriage surety thereby once again diminishing the
influence of gerontocratie control.
The movement became highly successful among urban youths in the
1980s, spreading into schools and colleges, and provoking occasional
clashes with staff. Strangely, however, the political authorities in
Blantyre and elsewhere seemed to tolerate the movement. The reason
for this later became clear: in the period preceding the democratie
changes certain MCP officials tried to coopt important members of
the movement for their own ends. For example, in 1992 Linley Mbeta
was invited by the official 'State Hostess', Mama Kadzamira, to
become the personal healer of President Banda at his Sanjika Palace
in Blantyre (see Van Dijk, 1994). Faced with growing opposition after
the publication of the bishops' Lenten Letter in March 1992, Linley
Mbeta was asked by President Banda to address all parliamentarians
at the cérémonial opening of the new parliamentary year in Zomba in
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August of the same year (Malawi's Daily Times, 10 August 1992).7
Another preacher involved with the MCP was a 12-year old, Ethel
Phiri, active in Lilongwe. During the général élection campaign of
1994 the press reported that Phiri, who had become the personal
protégée of Cabinet minister Katopola Phiri in Lilongwe, was being
used by party cadres to conduct large open-air revival meetings in the
mostly opposition squatter settlements of Ndirande Township.
What the movement, despite these cases of cooptation by the
regime, conveyed to many of the younger génération was that the
significance and meaning of the authority of gerontocratie miers such
as party chairmen, chiefs and elders could be apprehended in differ-
ent if not contesting ways (further évidence of this mode of
contestation can be found in Van Dijk & Pels, 1996). Although the
structure of society remained the same the born-again movement
made it clear - especially to many young people - that religion could
be used to create autonomous fields of organization, in effect to insti-
tute non-gerontocratie forms of authority, that would be well received
by ordinary people.
This notion of self-organization was of particular interest for the
youth of the main churches, among which the born-again movement
was gaining increasing support by the late 1980s and early 1990s,
much to the discomfort of the (often elderly) leaders of the
Presbyterian and Roman Catholic churches. Such figures feared that
their control over church-going youth was slipping from their hands
(for a discussion of this issue, see Van Dijk, 1992b). The influential
Student Christian Organisation of Malawi (SCOM), represented in
almost every secondary school and university college throughout the
country, became increasingly controlled by the born-again groups
which in many places took over leadership of local SCOM branches.
Beyond the control of the churches and other authorities, SCOM
meetings were turned into meetings of uncontrolled behaviour,
ecstasy and proselytism (Van Dijk, 1992a: 73). In the years prior to
the democratie changes many schools reported many such incidents
to the mission churches and local authorities. Combined with more
obviously politically oriented protests, many elderly leaders of the
churches also became increasingly worried about the 'indiscipline in
schools', as it was referred to in the Bishops' Lenten Letter (see also
Newell, 1995: 261).
It is difficult, as Fiedler (1995) has also noted, to establish as a
matter of fact what the position of born-agains was during and imme-
diately after the élection process. However, in my view, the youth-led
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pentecostal movement formed a first stage in the tnobilization of the
younger génération for a deeper-than-superficial democratie transi-
tion in Malawian society. At least up to 1994 their influence pertained
to the level of ideation and discourse, but was not 'transmitted' into
manifest political action. In the first quarter of 1995 this picture
changed with the founding of the Christian Democratie Party (CDP)
- the first in Malawi's history (Daily Monitor, 17 February 1995). The
CDP party was initiated by Eston Kakhome, an early born-again
preacher and former leader of the youth-led Gospel for All fellowship
(see Van Dijk, 1992a: 71). The party, however, had apparently had
very little impact on Malawi's political configurations - and by exten-
sion, its political culture - by the late 1990s. Contrary to the situation
in Zambia where the state president, Frederick Chiluba, a born-again
Christian, declared the country a Christian nation in early 1992, in
Malawi, the born-again ethos did not at this time seem to have
inspired political leadership. I return to this issue in the final section.
' The intervention the established churches undertook in 1992 to
change the political structure of the country, was in its intricacies of
micro-power in the end dependent on the massive mobilization of the
young for the democratie transition. Probably inadvertently it also
promoted a changing meaning of gerontocratie power in society - the
pentecostal youth groups represented an important example in this
regard. On the other hand, one could also argue that the result of the
1994 général élections did not clearly indicate the importance of the
shifts in the cultural and political constructions of gerontocracy. The
MCP did not reçoive füll support from the elderly in every région of
the country; furthermore, a 63 per cent vote in favour of the MCP in
the Central région indicates that at least some among the younger
génération must have been voting for the party candidates, although
Kaspin (1995:617) suggests that support for the MCP was often engi-
neered through coercion.
It is clear that opposition parties received support from older
people, particularly in the Southern and Northern régions, indicating
that the MCP had lost its appeal to many that formerly had been
included in its gerontocratie hegemony. However, as the conclusion
will suggest it is in fact a mistake to think of the opposition groups as
being against the elderly. Quite to the contrary, the opposition groups
have remained dominated by older people; there has been no quanti-
tative tranfer of power to the younger génération. But what has
changed is the meaning and représentation of gerontocratie power,
albeit without diminishing its efficacy. Voting for MCP or any of the
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opposition groups therefore was a matter of préférence for leadership
style, as well as an issue of allegiance in terms of personal leadership
qualifies. It was not a question of a demand for programmatic change
in the root paradigm of political power. The représentation of the
leadership style was important, but certainly did not undermine the
continuation of gerontocracy.
CONCLUSION AND INTERPRETATION: FROM NKHOSWE
TO MLANGIZI
Returning once more to Schatzberg's father-metaphor in understand-
ing African political cultures, it needs to be emphasized that hè does
not relate this root metaphor to a number of historical processes that
captures this discourse in the development of generation-political
power balances and the position of the subject vis-à-vis religiously and
magically determined perspectives on power. As we have just showed
in the Malawian case, Banda's metaphor of being the Nkhoswe
Number One was highly related and vested upon generational pol-
itics, while pentecostalism gave his young Malawian subjects the
ideological means to discrédit the gerontocratie basis of authority.
Banda's approach of the root metaphor of Nkhoswe in fact points at
the position of the institutional protector and surety, which in histor-
ical Chewa society is not occupied by the biological father of a subject,
but rather by the classificatory uncle. It is the maternai uncle who
takes over from the biological father the obligation to provide for
security, access to land, food, shelter, héritage and marriage and it is
the father who has a similar regulating position vis-à-vis his sister's
children. As many folk taies in oral tradition show it is important for
boys and young men that the protecting and ensuring rôle of the
Nkhoswe is feit the strongest as the matri-kin underscores their
subservient position in society.
This emotional element of protection in socio-political life was also
feit at a national level, strongly addressed by Banda in his claims of
being Nkhoswe Number One. For a long time the ritual implications
of being Nkhoswe for the nation were underscored by the hierarchy
of traditional authorities who attributed rainmaking-powers to Banda
and placed him at the top of their organizational structure. In 1992,
when the first negotiations between government and opposition
groups took place, traditional chiefs queued up at Sanjika Palace
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, The author wishes to express his gratitude for the critical coments and
suggestions hè received on an earlier draft of this chapter trom Peter
% Forster, Jan-Kees van Donge and participants of the ECPR workshop
'> on 'Political Culture and Religion in the Third World', Bordeaux, April
' . ï l995.-.-?•. .- .< ' v
Here I do not mean to equate supervision with violence. Other regimes
,in .Africa have been notoriously violent while they lacked the level of
.supervision over the entire society that clearly was the case in Malawi,
Medard writes, mockingly: 'Kamuzu Banda à réussi à imposer a sort
pays le plus haut degré de discipline en Afrique: les voitures s'arrettent
même au feu rouge. Cette discipline, qui fait l'admiration des experts
, en tout genre, rend l'atmosphère singulierment triste, étouffante et
oppressante' (Médard 1991: 99). ['Kamuzu Banda has succeeded in
imposing on his country the highest degree of discipline in Africa: cars
stop at red lights. This discipline, which has thé admiration of all kinds
1 of experts, renders a singularly sad, stifling and oppressive atmos-
phère.'] - translation by éditer.
As a core-group membèr of the Joint International Observer Group
(JIOG/UNDP), I have been personally involved in thé investgation of
thé harassaient of opposition-group members in a number of places
(specifically, Mchinji, Mponda (Ntcheu) and Blantyre). Details of the
most serious of thèse casés are also kept by the ICRC office, Blantyre.
See Poster (1994), Chirwa (1994), 'Kaspin (1995) and Van Donge
(1995) for analysis of thé inteiftwined ethnie and régional dimensions of
thé élection results.
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m .^ . . . . .
jjf asked clergymen from the Nkhorna Synod of the CCAP|tolpray|t4
ïff ; : Almighty God for rainsj a wish which materialised only 12 hóürs|ater|| ?
jßif Other fundamentalist groüps introduced into Malawi at a much earlier '••
|t date, some even dating back to the turn of the twentiethucenturyjf f
l ï i imcmde the Church of Christ, Seventh Day Adventisti Bréthrerf
|fe••* Church, Jehovah's Witnesses/Watchtower (expelled from the country
|| by the Banda-regime in the early seventies), and those relating to a
H i more pentecostalist type of fundamentalism such as thé Assemblies of «
l| # t God and the Füll Gospel Church. Although much more can ;be;said
ff about the différences, the present chapter focuses on the groupsjthat t
1
9. 5 originated in the course of what became known as the 'second pênté^ ,-.
l costal wave' in Malawi (see Schoffeleers, 1985). They werefnoit
introduced from elsewhere, but developed locally. * The «gröups
t discussed here, furthermore, only in exceptional cases developed intö i
-- : fully fledged churches; Usually these groups operate in the( form oit
ê more loosely organized 'ministries' and 'fellowships' (see^for a fuÜer •
• discussion of the historical transformations of fundamentalism in.
Malawian society Van Dijk, 1992a). 5 rs ? l S pf^V
1, A special service of worship was held at the main hall of Chancellof |
e College in Zomba with the thème of 'Blessed are those Who do the Will a
of God'* It was the first time such an event happened and President"
z Banda was thanked for allowing parliament to break for the aservicë\j
fn*-v which according to all present was 'unheard of in othericountries'
(thanks to M. Schoffeleers for this information). )^,i ï Ml i it
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